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I have come to suspect that it is easy to go too far with rigid rules in this area of
claimed sex discrimination, and to lose - indeed destroy - values that mean
much to some people .... I hope we do not lose all values that some think are
worthwhile (and are not based on differences of race and religion) and relegate
ourselves to needless conformity.
-Justice Harry A. Blackmun'
Introduction
In 1979, a student at Princeton University named Sally Frank filed
a complaint with the New Jersey Division on Civil Rights against
three social and eating clubs that restricted their memberships to
male students at Princeton University. The clubs - Ivy Club, Cot-
tage Club, and Tiger Inn - are three of a group of eleven clubs that
many students at Princeton University traditionally join to receive
meals and use social facilities.2 Frank alleged, and the Division
eventually ruled, that the all-male clubs violated the New Jersey Law
Against Discrimination, which prohibits discrimination on the basis
of sex in places of public accommodation. 3 The Princeton case sig-
nals problems for single-sex social organizations at other colleges
and universities in New Jersey and around the country. Forty states
and the District of Columbia have public accommodation laws simi-
lar to the New Jersey statute,4 and many fraternities, sororities, and
other social organizations have characteristics that make them vul-
1. Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 734-35 (1981) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting from a five to four holding that the State of Mississippi could not maintain
a school of nursing exclusively for women).
2. The other eight clubs had coeducational memberships as of 1979. The Cottage
Club changed its membership policy to admit women in 1986.
3. New Jersey law states, in relevant part, that " '[a] place of public accommodation'
shall include, but not be limited to... any.., place where food is sold for consumption
on the premises." The law also includes an exception for private clubs. N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 10:5-5(1) (West 1976).
4. Comment, The Unruh Civil Rights Act: An Uncertain Guarantee, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV.
443, 445 n.15 (1983).
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nerable to a ruling against their membership policies in light of the
Princeton case.
5
The three all-male clubs are privately owned and operated, and
the Division on Civil Rights originally ruled that the clubs were "by
their nature distinctly private" and exempt from the Law Against
Discrimination. 6 After the Division reversed itself on remand from
Frank's appeal to a New Jersey superior court,7 Ivy Club and Tiger
Inn filed suit in federal district court to enjoin the Division from
exercising jurisdiction over the clubs. The clubs argued that they
were not places of public accommodation under the statute and that
the Division's exercise of jurisdiction would abridge the club mem-
bers' constitutional right of freedom of association under the first
and fourteenth amendments.8
The Princeton case raises three issues in connection with single-
sex social organizations in university communities. First, it is un-
clear whether privately owned and operated social organizations
should, by virtue of their association with a university, lose their pri-
vate status and become "places of public accommodation." Second,
state laws that, as applied, prohibit private single-sex college social
organizations (CSOs) appear to infringe on members' constitutional
rights of freedom of association. Third, given the ambiguous status
of "private" single-sex college social organizations under state anti-
discrimination laws, it may be appropriate for state legislatures to
declare an explicit policy on those organizations in order to forestall
litigation and to allow a democratic choice on the issue. The United
States Congress, on several occasions, has passed legislation to en-
sure that federal law does not interfere with the selection of mem-
bers in college social organizations. 9 State legislatures should give
5. Greek letter societies, which make up the vast majority of single-sex college social
organizations, have over 9000 chapters around the country. BAIRD'S MANUAL OF AMERI-
CAN COLLEGE FRATERNITIES vii (J. Robson ed. 19th ed. 1977)
6. Frank v. Univ. Cottage Club, Nos. PL05-01678, 01679, 01680 (NJ. Div. on Civil
Rights, Dec. 9, 1981).
7. Frank v. Ivy Club, Nos. A-2378-81T3 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 1, 1983);
Frank v. Ivy Club, Nos. PL 05-1678, 05-1679, 05-1680 (N.J. Div. on Civil Rights, May 14,
1985).
8. Princeton Notebook, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Mar. 12, 1986, at 12.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(b) (1982), 20 U.S.C. § 1144 (1982), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a)(6)
(1982) and notes 69 through 75 and accompanying text below. Single-sex social organi-
zations have been a part of American college life for over 200 years. W. MUSGRAVE,
COLLEGE FRATERNITIES 6 (1923). The first all-male social group of which there is record
is "The Flat Hat Club," which appeared at the College of William and Mary in 1750.
The first female social organization, the Adelphean Society, was founded in 1851. In
1879, 26 Princeton undergraduates hired a steward and founded the Ivy Club. Cottage
Club, Tiger Inn, and other clubs followed shortly thereafter. F. RICH, THE FIRST HUN-
DRED YEARS OF THE IVY CLUB (1979). The choice of maintaining all-female or all-male
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serious consideration to the adoption of a similar policy, even if
courts do not accord constitutional protection to CSOs. The discus-
sion below is limited to the legal status of college social organiza-
tions that limit their memberships to one sex;' 0 discrimination
based on factors other than gender, such as race or religion, may
raise additional legal and policy issues.
I. State Public Accommodation Laws
Public accommodation laws generally prohibit discrimination on
the basis of race, religion, national origin, and sex in places of public
accommodation."I The major impetus for state public accommoda-
tion laws was the Supreme Court's holding in The Civil Rights
Cases in 1883.12 The Court struck down an act of Congress' 3 that
prohibited discrimination in places of public accommodation and
held that the fourteenth amendment empowered Congress to en-
sure only that no state violated the equal protection clause. With the
federal power to curtail discrimination by private citizens in public
places restricted by the Court's decision, many states enacted their
own anti-discrimination laws.
14
memberships has always been the right and responsibility of the organizations
themselves.
10. The analysis is based on the Princeton case, but it can be generalized to other
college social organizations. Generalizations, however, must take into account varying
state laws and differing relationships between CSOs and their related institutions. Two
aspects of the Princeton case are particularly important. First, Princeton University, a
private university, is a place of public accommodation under New Jersey law. Thus, this
analysis is most applicable to private institutions that are construed as places of public
accommodation and, to some extent, state universities. A case involving a private uni-
versity not covered by state law would be less likely to implicate an affiliated social or-
ganization for sex discrimination. Second, the all-male clubs at Princeton own their
property and buildings and receive no direct funding from the university. A social or-
ganization that receives tangible aid from a college or university will have more difficulty
dissociating itself from the institution. In general, however, the analysis is transferable
to other states and social organizations. (Certain social organizations that provide hous-
ing for members may receive special treatment in order to allow private living accommo-
dations for members of a single sex. In this day and age of coeducational dormitories
and coeducational bathrooms at colleges, however, it seems unlikely that these "pri-
vacy" requirements would deter aggressive enforcement of state civil rights laws.)
11. Comment, supra note 4, at 445 n. 15. Each state law includes different elements
in its definition of public accommodation. All of the laws, however, explicitly or implic-
itly include places that offer eating and/or sleeping accommodations. Id. at 447-48.
12. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see Comment, supra note 4, at 443;
Comment, Exclusion and Access in Public Accommodations: First Amendment Limitations upon
State Law, 16 PAC. L.J. 1047 (1985).
13. The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 18 Stat. 335 (1873-75) (invalidated by The Civil
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
14. New Jersey passed its first such law in 1884, providing in part that "all persons
within the jurisdiction of the state of New Jersey shall be entitled to the full and equal




State laws may regulate private activity unless they confront a con-
stitutional barrier, such as freedom of association, that overrides the
state interest in the regulation. No state's public accommodation
law, however, expressly includes private clubs in its ban on discrimi-
nation, and twenty-three states, including New Jersey, exclude from
the scope of their public accommodation laws private clubs or any
other place that is by its nature distinctly private. 15 The Princeton
case appears to be the first state attack on a college social
organization. 16
Federal courts have developed criteria to aid in determining
whether a club is private or a state actor, and state courts have done
the same to define the line between private clubs and places of pub-
lic accommodation. Organizations that have procedures for choos-
ing selective memberships, 17 fund their activities from private
sources,' 8 restrict the use of their facilities to members and bona
fide guests, govern themselves according to membership prefer-
ences, and can demonstrate that they were not founded with the
purpose of circumventing civil rights laws' 9 have been declared pri-
conveyances on land or water, theatres and other places of public amusement." Act of
May 10, 1884, Ch. 219, 1884 N.J. Laws 339 (current version at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-1
(West 1976)). A wide body of law has developed around the concept of "state action."
See GuNTHER, CONSTITrrTIONAL LAW 860-903 (11 th ed. 1985). Federal anti-discrimina-
tion law prohibits discrimination in any place of public accommodation that affects inter-
state commerce or is supported by state action. The law excludes private clubs that are
not open to the public. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1982). State anti-discrimination laws can be
more inclusive than federal law, because they do not require state action on behalf of the
discriminatory actor in order to ban discrimination. Compare Moose Lodge No. 107 v.
Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1977) (fourteenth amendment did not prohibit racial discrimination
at a private club) with Commonwealth Human Relations Comm'n v. Loyal Order of
Moose, Lodge No. 107, 448 Pa. 451, 294 A.2d 594 (1972), appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052
(1972) (private club becomes a place of public accommodation under Pennsylvania law
when it operates an unrestricted guest policy).
15. Comment, supra note 4, at 459-460 n.87.
16. On private clubs, see generally Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163; Cornelius v. Benevo-
lent Protectorate Order of Elks, 382 F. Supp. 1182 (D. Conn. 1974);Junior Chamber of
Commerce of Rochester v. U.S. Jaycees, 495 F.2d 883 (10th Cir. 1974); Kiwanis Club of
Great Neck v. Board of Trustees of Kiwanis Internat'l, 383 N.Y.S.2d 383 (1976); Kiwanis
Internat'l v. Ridgewood Kiwanis Club, Nos. 85-4306, 85-4483, slip op. (D. NJ. Feb. 6,
1986).
17. "Selectivity is the essence of a private club," Wright v. Cork Club, 315 F. Supp.
1143, 1151 (S.D. Tex. 1970). One-half to two-thirds of those attempting to join the
clubs at Princeton are unsuccessful.
18. College social organizations that receive direct aid from universities lose an ele-
ment of their private character. The Princeton clubs do not receive direct university aid.
19. Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1203, suggested that a club's history is pertinent to
determining its private status. On characteristics of private clubs, see generally Solo-
mon v. Miami Woman's Club, 359 F. Supp. 41 (S.D. Fla. 1973) (private women's club
may discriminate); Moose Lodge, 407 U.S. 163; Wright, 315 F. Supp. 1143 (club was not
private because, in part, it was not selective, operated for a profit, regularly served non-
members who were not bona fide guests, and advertised to increase patronage); Clover
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vate under both federal and state law. Some apparently private or-
ganizations have been declared state actors or places of public
accommodation, however, if they have given up their private status
by virtue of a close association or "symbiotic relationship" with the
state or another place of public accommodation.20
The New Jersey Division on Civil Rights applied this analysis of
"symbiotic relationship" to the Princeton social clubs. The Division
found that the Princeton clubs and the University had developed a
mutually beneficial and interdependent relationship. The clubs
would not exist without the University's student community, and the
University relies on the clubs to provide meals for upperclass stu-
dents.2 1 University publications cite the clubs as an upperclass din-
ing option, and some clubs advertise in The Daily Princetonian, the
student newspaper, to notify potential members of the dates and
times of open houses or membership interview sessions. Students
may apply financial aid money to meal contracts at private clubs, and
the University and the clubs have instigated a cooperative "meal ex-
change" program.2 2 The Division concluded that this relationship
with the University altered the status of the clubs, and it classified
them as places of public accommodation despite their otherwise pri-
vate character.
Although the Division's findings do indicate that college social or-
ganizations may be prominent entities in a university community, it
is not clear that the findings justify the reclassification of privately
Hill Swimming Club v. Goldsboro, 47 NJ. 25, 219 A.2d 161 (1966) (swimming club was
not private because it was operated for a profit and controlled by the shareholders
rather than the members).
20. The notion of a "symbiotic relationship" developed in federal law when civil
rights authorities attempted to reach "private" establishments that had close ties to a
state. The existence of a symbiotic relationship with a state can deprive an organization
of its private status and subject it to federal laws that prohibit discrimination by states or
state actors. In Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961), the
Supreme Court held that a restaurant, which leased property from a state-owned and
operated parking facility that financed all upkeep and maintenance of the building,
should be considered a state actor and not "purely private." Courts have used a similar
analysis to include "private" organizations within the scope of state public accommoda-
tion laws if they have a symbiotic relationship with another place of public accommoda-
tion. Franklin v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 590 F. Supp. 255 (D. Mass.
1984) (fraternal benefit organization closely affiliated with city police department is not
private organization); Firefighters Institute for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549
F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1977) (supper clubs using facilities at city firehouses may not refuse
membership to blacks).
21. Similarly, CSOs that provide sleeping accommodations allow the university to
budget a smaller amount of dormitory space.
22. Under the meal exchange program, a member of an eating club and a student
who eats at a university facility can eat meals together at either facility. Rather than
charging the guest, the facilities exchange information on meal transfers and withhold




owned and operated organizations as places of public accommoda-
tion for the purposes of state law. The Princeton clubs and similar
college social organizations meet all of the criteria that courts have
suggested for private status, and many of the CSOs' relationships
with associated universities are like those maintained by private
businesses, which would never be considered part of a university. 2"
Such student organizations receive little or no tangible assistance
from universities and are not under university control.2 4 Unlike
businesses or other private clubs, however, CSOs serve exclusively
students and have administrative arrangements with universities.
These facts place CSOs somewhere on a continuum between official
university organizations and independent private enterprises.
The New Jersey Division's interpretation of the state law, which
requires little or no tangible university support or control to impute
public character to a social organization, allows students only a nar-
row scope of private activity. As applied, the New Jersey public ac-
commodation law effectively outlaws single-sex social organizations
at colleges and universities. The Division's statutory interpretation
raises the important question of whether the ruling violates the club
members' constitutional right of freedom of association.2 5
II. Freedom of Association
The right to associate freely is not enumerated in the Constitu-
tion. The Supreme Court first recognized a constitutionally pro-
23. Private businesses in university communities exhibit many of the characteristics
of CSOs. They advertise in school newspapers and rely on students for business. In
many cases, new businesses open in college areas because the students create a demand
for their products. University publications often list local businesses for the information
of students. Universities rely on area businesses to serve their students and faculty and
to provide employment for spouses of faculty members. Universities often take active
roles in developing local economies in order that the university may benefit from a pros-
perous surrounding. Students may apply financial aid money to meal purchases wher-
ever they like (there are no administrative connections between Princeton University
and the clubs for purposes of meal contract payments), and rules defining disciplinary
procedures for improper conduct by students at private clubs are the same that apply to
other off-campus private facilities.
24. Indeed, Princeton University maintains that it would prefer that the clubs admit
women, but that the clubs are entirely separate and private organizations over which the
University has no control. Princeton Notebook, PRINCETON ALUMNI WEEKLY, Mar. 12, 1986,
at 12.
25. Another objection to the New Jersey public accommodation law, which is not
discussed herein, is that the law as interpreted by the Division on Civil Rights is uncon-
stitutionally vague and overbroad. This analysis will presume the Division's interpreta-
tion to be valid under the void for vagueness doctrine, in order to discuss the
implications of a law banning single-sex college social organizations. The vagueness is-
sue is, however, a legitimate point of contention, and it will be litigated in the Princeton
case.
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tected right of association in 1958 in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson.26 In NAACP, the Court held that the requirement that the
NAACP reveal its membership lists to the state violated the group's
right to associate freely. In explicating this right, Justice Harlan
wrote:
It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for the ad-
vancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the "liberty"
assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech. . . . Of course, it is immaterial
whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by association pertain to
political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and state action
which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is sub-
ject to the closest scrutiny.
27
Despite the Court's statement that the right of association ex-
tended to groups interested in extra-political matters, it remained
unclear whether the Constitution would protect apolitical associa-
tions, including social organizations .2  Some commentators recog-
nized that the right of association would afford some constitutional
protection to personal associations, 29 and dicta from the Supreme
Court's holding in Griswold v. Connecticut validated that notion. Jus-
tice Douglas wrote:
The right of "association," like the right of belief, is more than the
right to attend a meeting; it includes the right to express one's atti-
tudes or philosophies by membership in a group or by affiliation with
it or by other lawful means. Association in that context is a form of
expression of opinion; and while it is not expressly included in the
First Amendment its existence is necessary in making the express
guarantee fully meaningful.30
Griswold was the first of a series of decisions that specifically recog-
nized a right of freedom of "intimate association" as opposed to the
"expressive association" suggested by NAACP. 3 1 While the marital
26. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
27. Id. at 460-61.
28. See Comment, State Universities and the Discriminatory Fraternity: A Constitutional Anal-
ysis, 8 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 169, 187 (1961); Note, Section 1981 and Private Groups: The Right to
Discriminate Versus Freedom from Discrimination, 84 YALE L.J. 1441, 1458-59 (1975).
29. Emerson, Freedom of Association and Freedom of Expression, 74 YALE L.J. 1, 20 (1964).
30. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
31. Other leading examples of intimate association include Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405
U.S. 438 (1972) (holding unconstitutional a law preventing distribution of contracep-
tives to unmarried couples); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) and Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (recognizing right to marry); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431
U.S. 494 (1977) (recognizing sanctity of extended family); and Pierce v. Society of Sis-
ters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (recognizing "liberty of parents and guardians to direct up-
bringing and education of children under their control"). See generally Karst, The Freedom




and family relationships are at the center of the development of a
right of intimate association, close friendships also should receive
constitutional protection.32 The Supreme Court first explicitly rec-
ognized the dual character of the right of association in 1984 in Rob-
erts v. United States Jaycees,33 which held that an all-male Jaycees
chapter in Minnesota was not an association that qualified for con-
stitutional protection. An analysis of that decision helps to under-
stand what constitutional protection will be afforded single-sex
college social organizations.
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in Roberts, identified two
distinct areas of protected association. The first, expressive association,
ensures the "right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those
activities protected by the first amendment - speech, assembly, pe-
tition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion."
34
The second, intimate association, ensures that "choices to enter into
and maintain certain intimate human relationships must be secured
against undue intrusion by the State because of the role of such rela-
tionships in safeguarding the individual freedom that is central to
our constitutional scheme." 3
5
A. Expressive Association
College social organizations are protected by the right of expres-
sive association only to a small degree. Because the organizations
are designed for interaction among members, social organizations'
only claim to protection of an expressive association is through
those values that they express by their mere existence. Although
values of tradition and camaraderie may be important, the expres-
sion of those values is too removed from the CSOs' central social
purposes to merit strong constitutional protection. A state legisla-
ture's desire to create a fully coeducational college environment
probably would outweigh a college social organization's interests in
expressive association.
B. Intimate Association
College social organizations receive stronger protection from the
right of freedom of intimate association. In Roberts, the Court out-
lined a continuum of associations ranging from the most protected
32. Karst, supra note 31, at 629.
33. 104 S. Ct. 3244 (1984).
34. Id. at 3249.
35. Id.
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(the family) to the least protected (a large corporation such as Gen-
eral Motors). Protected associations, the Court said, "involve deep
attachments and commitments to the necessarily few other individu-
als with whom one shares not only a special community of thoughts,
experiences, and beliefs but also distinctly personal aspects of one's
life." 36 The Court listed several characteristics - relative small-
ness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain
the affiliation, seclusion from others in critical aspects of the rela-
tionship, and congeniality - that the Court would use to identify
protected associations falling on the "family" end of the Roberts con-
tinuum. College social organizations exhibit each of these charac-
teristics, and they appear to merit strong protection under the
constitutional principle articulated in Roberts.
3 7
1. Characteristics of an Intimate Association
a) Smallness
The active memberships of most college social organizations are
much smaller than the 400-person Jaycee chapters that the Roberts
Court considered "large."38 The average mens' fraternity chapter in
1984-85 included fifty members.3 9 The memberships at Princeton's
all-male clubs are approximately seventy persons.
Most college social organizations also have graduate members
who participate in some group functions. For the purposes of a con-
stitutional analysis of intimacy, however, it would be inappropriate
to include alumni members in a calculation of the size of the organi-
zations.40 The active memberships are the groups that form the
day-to-day intimate relationships; alumni participate only peripher-
ally through alumni dinners, fundraising, and graduate board
governance.
4 1
36. Id. at 3250.
37. See Linder, Freedom of Association After Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 82 MICH. L.
REV. 1878, 1886 (1984); Rumsey, Legal Aspects of the Relationship Between Fraternities and
Public Institutions of Higher Education, I IJ. COLL. & UNIV. LAw 465, 478 (1985).
38. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3251.
39. Rumsey, supra note 37, at 467 (citing studies by the National Interfraternity
Conference).
40. The New Jersey Division on Civil Rights concluded that the Princeton clubs did
not deserve constitutional protection, in part because their total memberships, including
alumni, numbered in the thousands.
41. The fallacy of including graduates in a calculation of size is evident when we
consider a social organization that maintains the identical undergraduate size and char-
acter each school year but loses its qualification as an intimate association after two years





Most college social organizations unquestionably are selective. At
Princeton, between one-half and two-thirds of those students apply-
ing for membership in the all-male clubs are not accepted. Club
members spend three days acquainting themselves with potential
members through a formal process, and they deliberate for a total of
over twenty-four hours in selecting a new group of members. Fra-
ternity and sorority rush procedures often involve even more in-
depth consideration of prospective members and produce similarly
selective results. Within these organizations, the methods for choos-
ing officers and alumni graduate board members are selective as
well.
c) Seclusion in Critical Aspects
The choice of new members - the function most critical to the
perpetuation of the social organization's intimate association - is
performed in total seclusion from non-members. The lengthy mem-
bership selection process is private and confidential. 42 Other func-
tions, such as club meetings and periodic club dinners, are open to
members only. Meals are open to a limited number of guests of
members, and guests may attend social functions only with an offi-
cial invitation or guest pass.43
d) Congeniality
The Roberts court used the imprecise characteristic of congeniality
to fill out its vision of an intimate association. Although the Court
declined to define the elements of a protected association exactly, it
indicated that the purpose behind an association and the atmos-
phere within the group may be pertinent to the constitutional analy-
sis of freedom of association. College social organizations exhibit
characteristics that correspond with the Court's vision of a protected
association. CSOs choose memberships with friendships in mind,
and many members of single-sex social organizations feel that cama-
raderie is enhanced by limiting membership to one sex. For some
students, the social pressures that emanate from relations with the
opposite sex during college years can impede the development of an
open and collegial atmosphere. One purpose of single-sex CSOs is
42. See, e.g., CONSTITUTION OF THE IVY CLUB, art. VII, § 5 (1978).
43. These characteristics refer to the Princeton clubs. They may also apply to other
CSOs.
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to foster a congenial and intimate environment that provides a small
community for college students.
44
2. The Roberts Continuum
An analysis of college social organizations in light of the Roberts
criteria for identifying protected associations shows that CSOs fall
much closer to the "family" end ofJustice Brennan's spectrum than
to the "General Motors" end. For many college students, the social
organization is their family life. In 1923, Musgrave made an obser-
vation that remains true today:
The vast majority of students at colleges have no family life. They are
far from their homes, and a fraternity properly organized has, in more
than one case, supplied perhaps the best substitute possible for the
family relation.
45
The model of a college social organization as a surrogate family
continues to have merit in the society of the 1980s, which contains
more fragmented families and more students who travel away from
their hometowns for college than did the society of the 1920s.
46
The social organization often is not only an extension of a member's
home,47 but it is his or her home. Even in those cases where the
club or society does not serve the full function of a home,48 the pro-
vision of meals, reading material, television, stereo, and other recre-
ational facilities is a substantial surrogate.
Although the constitutional right of association of college social
organization members is implicated seriously by the application of a
law that bars the existence of single-sex CSOs, the right of associa-
tion is not absolute. 49 Thus, we must examine the state's interest in
banning single-sex CSOs to determine whether the interest is suffi-
ciently compelling to override the students' constitutional right.
44. The "congeniality test" does not imply that coeducational organizations cannot
exhibit the same sociable quality. The Roberts factors require simply that the association
that seeks to be protected exhibit these characteristics, regardless of whether other orga-
nizations do so as well.
45. MUSGRAVE, supra note 9, at 137.
46. For example, the divorce rate per 1000 women has risen from 8.0 in 1920 to
22.6 in 1980. The percent of high school graduates aged 18-24 enrolled in college has
risen from 4.7 percent in 1920 to over 30 percent in 1980. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 57149 (105th ed.
1985).
47. Cornelius, 382 F. Supp. at 1204, suggested the question of whether a club served
as an extension of members' homes rather than their businesses as a means of determin-
ing the club's private character.
48. The Princeton clubs only provide sleeping accommodations for a fraction of
their memberships.




C. Countervailing State Interests
1. State Power over College Students
The state's power over the affairs of its own educational institu-
tions and their students traditionally has been broad. Students'
rights often have been assessed in terms of contractual relation-
ships. By enrolling at a university, the student is deemed to have
agreed to abide by the school's regulations.50 Courts recently have
recognized, however, that students retain, to some extent, the im-
portant constitutional rights of freedom of speech and expression, 5'
privacy, 52 and due process53 when those rights are restricted by in-
stitutional regulations.
The Supreme Court also recognized the expressive branch of a
right of association for college students in Healy v. James.54 In that
case, the Court held that a state college could not withhold official
recognition from a student organization of whose views it disap-
proved. The Court stated in dicta that the "vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the commu-
nity of American schools." '55
Few past cases have involved college social organizations and
freedom of association. In 1915, the Supreme Court held that a
state legislature could require students wishing to attend a state uni-
versity to sign a pledge that they were not and would not become
members of a fraternity.5 6 This case, Waugh v. Board of Trustees of
University of Mississippi, was decided forty-three years before the
Court identified a right of association; it held that the interest of a
state in pursuing a desired educational policy outweighed the rights
of the individual students. A federal district court followed the rea-
soning of Waugh in Webb v. State University of New York. 57 The Webb
court held that SUNY could forbid social organizations to have a
direct or indirect affiliation with any national organization or other
organization outside the university.
In the only major case concerning a college social organization
decided after the Court's recognition of the right of freedom of as-
50. See, e.g., John B. Stetson Univ. v. Hunt, 88 Fla. 510, 102 So. 637 (1924); Samson
v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 101 Misc. 146, 167 N.Y.S. 202 (Sup.Ct. 1917), aftd, 181
App. Div. 936, 167 N.Y.S. 1125 (1917).
51. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
52. American Future Systems v. Pennsylvania State Univ., 688 F.2d 907, 915 (3rd
Cir. 1982).
53. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
54. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
55. Id. at 180 (citing Shelton v.Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960)).
56. Waugh v. Board of Trustees of Univ. of Miss., 237 U.S. 589 (1915).
57. 125 F. Supp. 910 (N.D.N.Y. 1954).
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sociation in NAACP v. Alabama, a federal district court declined to
determine whether members of a social fraternity had a right of as-
sociation. 58 In that case, Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of University of
Colorado, the court ruled that if the members did have such a right, it
would be a relative right that should be weighed against a compet-
ing state interest.59
These cases concerning college social organizations involve
problems distinct from those presented by the Princeton case. Sigma
Chi concerned official recognition of a group by a university. Such
recognition is irrelevant to CSOs threatened by state public accom-
modation laws and is undesirable because the social group's claims
to private status and freedom of association are enhanced by auton-
omy from the university. Waugh relates more closely to Frank v. Ivy
Club because it involves a state legislature's control over students
and their associations. There is a great difference, however, between
a legislature ordering that a student may not affiliate with any social
group outside university control, as in Waugh, and a legislature set-
ting the membership policies of private organizations that students
may join, as in Frank v. Ivy Club.60 As the Roberts Court noted:
There can be no clearer example of an intrusion into the internal
structure or affairs of an association than a regulation that forces the
group to accept members it does not desire. . . . Freedom of association
therefore plainly presupposes a freedom not to associate. 61
Roberts, the Supreme Court's most recent statement on the right of
association, makes it clear that expressive and intimate groups have
a constitutional right to exclude persons from membership, and that
government's ability to dictate membership policies is limited.62
58. Sigma Chi Fraternity v. Regents of Univ. of Colo., 258 F. Supp. 515 (D. Colo.
1966).
59. Id. at 525. The University of Colorado placed its Beta Mu chapter on probation
because of an unwritten policy of the national Sigma Chi fraternity not to admit blacks.
The court held that the University's interest in revoking official recognition to discour-
age racial discrimination outweighed any claim the fraternity may have had to freedom
of association.
60. Despite this distinction, the logic of Waugh, which allows a state to prohibit stu-
dents from joining "secret orders, chapters, fraternities, sororities, societies, and organi-
zations of whatever name, or without a name," 237 U.S. at 591, might also be subject to
reversal in light of the Court's development of the right of association since 1915. See
Rumsey, supra note 37 at 478-79.
61. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3252 (emphasis added). AlthoughJustice Brennan was re-
ferring to expressive association in this passage, the force of the argument applies as
strongly to intimate association.
62. In fact, a ruling that state governments may dictate membership policies of CSOs




2. State Interests Related to College Social Organizations
How, then, does the state support its apparently unprecedented
regulation of student life? Clearly, the Division on Civil Rights in
New Jersey considers the Princeton clubs part of the University and
contends that all of the advantages, privileges and facilities of the
University should be made available to all students on a non-dis-
criminatory basis. The state has an interest, it follows, in eradicating
sex discrimination in any organization that serves students exclu-
sively, regardless of the extent of the organization's legal or finan-
cial ties to a college or university.
The state has an interest in "removing the barriers to economic
advancement and political and social integration that have histori-
cally plagued certain disadvantaged groups, including women." 63
This interest certainly applies to programs operated by the univer-
sity itself. Education is central to economic and social advancement,
and the state has a compelling interest in prohibiting discrimination
in education against any group of persons.64 The state's interest
wanes, however, as its regulation recedes from the central academic
and extracurricular functions of the university to the private associa-
tions of students.
The fact that persons are enrolled as students at a college or uni-
versity cannot prevent them from exercising their constitutional
rights. 65 A student may spend an extended period of time within
university-controlled facilities, especially if many of the student's
needs - living accommodations, eating facilities, and social func-
tions - are met by the school. A student retains a sphere of privacy
rights, however, that allow him or her to leave the university to live
in a private environment.
The university, as an institution, properly is subject to state regu-
lation requiring it to provide privileges and services in a non-
discriminatory manner. Academic functions, dormitories and cafe-
terias provided by the school, and extracurricular groups funded
and operated by the university are elements of the university's core.
A student, on the other hand, cannot be required to relinquish his
or her rights in a context not controlled by the university. As Justice
Goldberg wrote in 1964, "it is the constitutional right of every per-
son to close his home or his club to any person or to choose his
social intimates . . . on the basis of personal prejudices ....
These and other rights pertaining to privacy and private association
63. Roberts, 104 S. Ct. at 3254.
64. See Brown v. Board of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. See supra notes 51 through 55 and accompanying text.
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are themselves constitutionally protected liberties." 66  Students
must have the opportunity to leave the university context to exercise
that right of privacy, including the right to associate freely with their
peers. Simply by virtue of their enrollment in a university, a group
of men or women should not forfeit rights of association that they
would otherwise enjoy. When the state moves outside of matters
controlled by a university to regulate students' lives in a way that it
could not regulate non-students' lives, its interest becomes far less
compelling.
67
The Supreme Court's clarification of the right of association in
Roberts v. Jaycees provides relevant factors with which to evaluate the
constitutional claims of single-sex college social organizations. The
fact that these associations are relatively small, highly selective, con-
genial, and secluded from others in critical aspects of their relation-
ships indicates that they deserve constitutional protection. The
state's interest in reducing sex discrimination decreases in areas of
student life removed from university control and tangible university
support. A state law that, as applied, effectively outlaws private sin-
gle-sex college social organizations is unconstitutional.
66. Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 313 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
67. Another theory on which the state might rely to establish a compelling interest in
eliminating sex discrimination in CSOs is the "essential" or "public function" analysis.
Under this view, a private entity that provides a public function can lose its private char-
acter. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946). Because CSOs provide food and/or ac-
commodations to students at universities that are places of public accommodation, the
state could argue that CSOs perform a public function. The state might use this argu-
ment to show that CSOs are places of public accommodation under state law and to
establish a compelling interest that would justify a denial of students' claims to a consti-
tutional right of association.
The Supreme Court, however, narrowed the applicability of the public function anal-
ysis in Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345 (1974), and it is unlikely that
CSOs are vulnerable to the amended legal doctrine. In Jackson, the Court held that a
privately-owned utility, licensed and regulated by a state public utility commission,
could not be deemed a state actor by virtue of the public function analysis, because the
private entity had not exercised powers traditionally reserved exclusively to the state.
The Court refused to convert into state action the conduct of businesses that provide
arguably essential goods and services.
The Court's ruling in Jackson puts CSOs outside the class of private entities that can
be deemed public as a result of their performance of public functions. Many universities
and colleges do not provide food and/or accommodations for their students, and those
functions are not "reserved exclusively" to universities. At Princeton, for example, many
upperclass students do not have meal contracts with either a university facility or a pri-
vate eating club and obtain their meals from another source. A majority of upperclass





Public accommodation laws in New Jersey and other states do not
indicate clearly the status of college social organizations. In the ab-
sence of definitive direction from state legislatures, forty-one differ-
ent appellate courts and administrators of civil rights divisions may
determine the fate of the centuries-old tradition of single-sex CSOs.
A court decision in Frank v. Ivy Club is likely to hinge on the unique
facts of the case, and parties in other locales will have to relitigate
similar issues in future cases in the absence of a statement of specific
legislative policy.
Regardless of the constitutionality of state laws that effectively
ban single-sex college social organizations, strong policy reasons
justify exempting fraternities, sororities, and other single-sex CSOs
from anti-discrimination laws. A legislative pronouncement on the
issue of CSOs will ensure that this important choice of social policy
is made by the branch of government most responsive to the popu-
lar will. A clear legislative statement establishing the status of CSOs
under public accommodation laws also will give administrators an
intelligible principle to guide their exercise of delegated discretion
and will ensure that reviewing courts will be able to test administra-
tive action against a clearly ascertainable definition of public accom-
modation.68 On three occasions, the United States Congress has
exempted college social organizations from federal laws that other-
wise would regulate their memberships. The reasons cited by Con-
gress, together with other considerations, provide a strong
foundation for exempting college social organizations from state
laws against discrimination.
A. Policy Reasons for Exemption of Single-Sex CSOs
1. Freedom of Association
A 1964 amendment to the 1957 Civil Rights Act exempts mem-
bership practices of college social organizations from investigation
by the Civil Rights Commission. 69 In support of the amendment,
which passed the House of Representatives on a voice vote, Repre-
sentative Long of Louisiana proclaimed:
I can see no basis for real opposition to an amendment which simply
verifies a common desire of the Congress to avoid the interference in
areas which impinge on the most elemental part of man's nature, to
68. For a discussion of legislative delegation, see Industrial Union Dep't v. American
Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
69. 42 U.S.C. § 1975c(b) (1982).
441
Yale Law & Policy Review
freely associate with people that share his common ideals ....
[Aillowing these investigations into our private sanctuaries could do
irreparable harm to the whole fabric of our society.
70
The Waggonner Amendment, passed by Congress in 1965, further
modified the 1964 Civil Rights Act to preserve the right of college
students to associate privately.
71
Even if courts, in the future, do not recognize a constitutional
right of association for college social organizations, state legisla-
tures may advance broader views of freedom of association through
legislation. Legislatures and citizens that favor a right of students to
associate in single-sex social organizations may desire to express
that position in legislation in order to avoid uncertain treatment of
the issue by the judiciary.
2. Tradition
In 1974, Congress amended the Education Amendments of 1972
to exempt single-sex college social organizations from the require-
ments of Title IX of the Civil Rights Act that prohibit discrimination
on the basis of sex in federally-funded institutions.72 The prime
Senate sponsor of Title IX, Senator Birch Bayh of Indiana, intro-
duced the amendment after the Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare proposed regulations that would apply Title IX restric-
tions to single-sex CSOs. 73 In support of the amendment, Bayh
wrote, "Fraternities and sororities have been a tradition in the coun-
try for over 200 years. Greek organizations, much like the single-
sex college, must not be destroyed in a misdirected effort to apply
Title IX.'
'74
For many, single-sex social organizations represent a traditional
source of stability and community in college life. They meet many of
the social and cultural needs of students. 75 They provide a surro-
gate family for students away from home and offer students an op-
portunity to grow with peers who share common values, problems,
and goals. Many members of all-male and all-female CSOs feel that
the single-sex nature of the groups is important to the cohesive at-
mosphere that the organizations provide.
70. 110 CONG. REC. 2293 (1964) (statement of Rep. Long).
71. 20 U.S.C. § 1144(b) (1982).
72. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(6) (1982).
73. 120 CONG. REc. 39992 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
74. Id. at 39993.
75. Id. (letter from Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Caspar Weinberger




Congress felt that college social organizations do little, if any-
thing, to perpetuate discrimination against women - a charge that
often is leveled against private clubs that serve exclusively business-
men and other professionals.7 6 Senator Bayh emphasized that his
exemption "covers only social .. .organizations; it does not apply
to professional fraternities or societies whose admissions practices
might have a discriminatory effect upon the future career opportuni-
ties of a woman."
77
3. Pluralism and Diversity
Single-sex college social organizations also maintain an element
of diversity in the pluralistic American system. Some fear that an
overzealous expansion of anti-discrimination law might weaken soci-
ety by leading to the destruction of community and needless con-
formity.78 A legislature might agree with the 1974 Congress'
evaluation that benefits from the maintenance of community and di-
verse social options at colleges are greater than the costs of sex dis-
crimination by single-sex social organizations.
B. Opposition to Single-Sex Groups
Although the attitude of Congress toward single-sex CSOs and
the continuing popularity of such organizations on college cam-
puses79 indicate that state legislatures will best represent their con-
stituents by allowing the continued existence of all-male and all-
female social groups, some states may desire to eliminate single-sex
social organizations. Some writers who espouse this view argue that
sex discrimination in social organizations helps to perpetuate dis-
crimination in the post-educational professional world.8 0 Although
the opportunities to develop valuable social and business contacts in
a college club may be fewer than those in a professional club, these
opportunities may not be negligible. The maintenance of tradi-
76. See, e.g., Comment, Sex Discrimination in Private Clubs, 24 HASTINGS LJ. 417 (1977);
Comment, Discrimination in Private Social Clubs: Freedom of Association and Right to Privacy,
1970 DUKE L.J. 1181 (1970).
77. 120 CONG. REC. 39992 (1974) (statement of Sen. Bayh).
78. On the tension between the values of community and rights-oriented liberalism,
see Linder, supra note 37, at 1882.
79. As of 1966, there were 5679 men's college social groups and 3916 women's col-
lege social groups in the United States. BAIRD'S MANUAL OF AMERICAN COLLEGE FRATER-
NIES, supra note 5, at vii; Rumsey, supra note 37, at 467 n. 11. The most recent data
reported in BAIRD'S show that between 1967 and 1976, the number of men's organiza-
tions increased by 11 percent and the number of women's groups grew by 26 percent.
80. See Comment, supra note 76, 24 HASTINGS L.J. at 419.
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tional sexual distinctions in the name of brotherhood and commu-
nity could be seen as an invitation to prejudice."'
Laws against discrimination that explicitly apply to private college
social organizations may be unconstitutional due to the right of as-
sociation outlined above. A policy statement against single-sex
CSOs, however, would clarify the legislature's intent to classify
CSOs as places of public accommodation to the extent permissible
under the constitution, and states that favor this approach probably
could eliminate any tangible college or university support for single-
sex organizations.
The importance of the right to associate or not to associate, which
has been recognized by the U.S. Congress and the U.S. Supreme
Court, and the continued popularity of single-sex college social or-
ganizations, suggest that state legislatures should follow Congress'
lead and exempt fraternities, sororities, and other single-sex CSOs
from state laws against discrimination. This policy is supported by
the fact that any discriminatory impact upon the opposite sex cre-
ated by exclusion from a college social organization is less than that
caused by exclusion from a college pre-professional organization,
such as a group of engineering students, or a business-related sin-
gle-sex organization that is used for career advancement. A legisla-
ture's decision to exempt single-sex CSOs from anti-discrimination
laws, however, merely allows the possibility of their existence.
Members of a single-sex college social organization may have
good reason to amend their membership policy. A coeducational
social organization would be more diverse than a single-sex group
and would reflect more accurately personal relations in society as a
whole. Students also may feel that a coeducational environment is
simply more enjoyable. On the other hand, the existence of over
9000 single-sex CSOs in the United States shows that many persons
value the tradition, camaraderie, relaxed atmosphere, or other as-
pects of a single-sex environment. Legislatures need not and
should not attempt to make a decision on associational preference
for college students. They will support the best public policy if they
allow continued freedom of choice.
Conclusion
The potential for future litigation surrounding college social or-
ganizations is significant. The New Jersey experience demonstrates




that CSOs may be vulnerable to state regulation of places of public
accommodation under vague statutes. State laws that effectively ban
single-sex CSOs, however, infringe on students' constitutional right
of association and should be ruled invalid. Furthermore, regardless
of the resolution of the constitutional questions, state legislatures
have sound policy reasons to exempt CSOs from anti-discrimination
laws as Congress has done on multiple occasions.
The Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Roberts clarified the right
of association, but its criteria have not yet been applied to college
social organizations. The New Jersey law threatens to restrict the
rights of a university student to choose his or her social intimates.
Although single-sex social organizations have a long tradition at
American colleges and universities and enjoy strong public support,
they have encountered a challenge in the Princeton case and may
face similar fights elsewhere. Those legislators and judges who
hope to end by government mandate the tradition of single-sex col-
lege social organizations would do well to remember the words of
Justice John Harlan, the first expositor of the constitutional right of
association and a former undergraduate president of Princeton's Ivy
Club: 8
2
Freedom of the individual to choose his associates or his neighbors, to
use and dispose of his property as he sees fit, to be irrational, arbitrary,
capricious, even unjust in his personal relations are entitled to a large
measure of protection from governmental interference.
83
- Steven M. Colloton
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82. Justice Harlan was a member of the section of 1920 at The Ivy Club.
83. Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 250 (1962).
